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III INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
CLAUDIA MARTIN*
During the period covered by this report, the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights (hereinafter the 'Court') issued the following judgments on the merits and
reparations: Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala; Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia;
Xdkmok Kdsek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay; Ferndndez Ortega et al. v. Mexico;
Rosendo Cantti et al. v. Mexico; Ibsen Cdrdenas and Ibsen Peha v. Bolivia; Vlez Loor v.
Panama; Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha Do Araguaia") v. Brazil; Cabrera Garcfa and
Montiel Flores v. Mexico; Gelman v. Uruguay; Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador; Abrill
Alosilla et al. v. Peru; Vera Vera et v Ecuador; Chocr6n Chocr6n v Venezuela; Mejfia
Idrovo v Ecuador; Torres Millacura et al v Argentina; Grande v Argentina; Contreras et
al v El Salvador and L6pez Mendoza v Venezuela.
The present report first analyses the Court's judgments in Ferndndez Ortega et al.1
and Rosendo Cantr et al.2 because the factual situations as well as the legal discussion
on whether rape constitutes an act of torture under the American Convention on
Human Rights (hereinafter 'Convention') in both cases are similar. The Court also
addresses the inappropriateness of using the military justice system in cases of human
rights violations. Second, this report reviews the facts and conclusions in Gomes
Lund,3 a case involving the legality of Brazil's amnesty law.
The full texts of the decisions found in this report may be found on the Court's
website at www.corteidh.or.cr.
Claudia Martin is Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and
Professorial Lecturer in Residence, American University, Washington College of Law (WCL). I
would like to thank the research, editing support and comments provided by Sarah K. Mazzochi, a
senior legal researcher at the Academy and WCL student.
I I/A Court HR, Ferndndez Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Series C no 215, 30 August 2010.
2 I/A Court HR, Rosendo Canta et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Series C no. 216, 31 August 2010.
3 I/A Court HR, Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha Do Araguaia") v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Series C no 219,24 November 2010.
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1. THE USE OF RAPE AS AN ACT OF TORTURE AGAINST
MEXICO'S INDIGENOUS WOMEN IN FERNANDEZ
ORTEGA ET AL. AND ROSENDO CANTU ET AL.
For the first time, in Ferndndez Ortega et al. and Rosendo Cant6 et al., the Court
unequivocally found rape may constitute an act of torture. The Inter-American system
had previously addressed human rights violations involving rape on four separate
occasions.
First, in Raquel Martin de Mejia v. Peru, the issue before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 'Commission') was whether Peru was
responsible for breaching the right to privacy (Article 11) and the right to humane
treatment (Article 5) in connection with Article 1(1) of the American Convention on
Human Rights ('Convention') after Raquel Martin de Mejia was raped by Peruvian
military personnel. 4
The Commission held that international law and practice established that sexual
assaults committed by security forces were a violation of the human right to physical
and mental integrity. The Commission based its conclusions on several provisions of
international humanitarian law, specifically Articles 27 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 ('GC'), Articles Article 76 of Additional Protocol I to the GC,
Common Article 3 of the GC and Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II to the GC.
Also, it referred to Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia that considers rape practiced on a systematic and large scale a crime against
humanity to support the characterisation of rape as torture.
The Commission found that even if Article 5 of the Convention does not specify the
acts that constitute torture, the definition provided in Article 2 of the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture ('Torture Convention') provided an
appropriate framework to assess whether certain acts can be characterised as such
under the Convention. In light of that definition, the Commission concluded that to
be characterised as torture, acts must meet compliance with three elements. First, "it
must be an intentional act through which physical and mental pain and suffering is
inflicted on a person."'5 Second, "it must be committed with a purpose."6 Lastly, "it
must be committed by a public official or by a private person acting at the instigation
of the former." 7
The Commission further found that rape fitted within the first element in that it
is both physical and mental abuse perpetrated through violence. Real suffering was
often the result. Regarding the second element, Raquel Mejia was raped to intimidate
4 IACHR, Raquel Martin de Mejia v Peru, Report 5/96, Case 10,970, 1 March 1996, Annual Report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1996.





and punish her for her husband's involvement in alleged anti-government activities.
Moreover, one of the purposes named in the Torture Convention was personal
punishment and intimidation. Thus, Raquel Mejia's rape met the second element of
torture. As for the third element, the act must be committed by a public official or at
the instigation of a public official. In this case, the man who raped Raquel Mejia was
a security forces member, and, therefore, the third and final element of torture was
satisfied. Ultimately, the Commission found that the rape of Raquel Mejia constitutes
torture under Article 5 of the Convention and a violation of her privacy, honour, and
dignity under Article 11 of that treaty.8
Second, Haiti's 1995 Country Report 9 detailed the violence against women and
sexual abuse in that state. The Country Report found that many acts of sexual abuse
were committed by members of the Haitian army, the police, or the armed civilian
auxiliaries with tolerance or even authorisation from the state. The Country Report
indicated this was a violation of Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention. Moreover, the
Commission considered that rape in this context could be torture under Article 5(2)
of the Convention because it is a brutal demonstration of discrimination against
women. Rape as a weapon of terror could also be a crime against humanity if used in
this way.
Third, the Court addressed the issue of whether there was a violation under Article
5 of the Convention for the first time in Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru.t ° Maria Elena Loayza
was accused of terrorism and kept in preventive detention without access to a court
for more than ten days. During Maria Elena Loayza-Tamayo's interrogation at the
hands of Peruvian officials, she testified that she was repeatedly raped. However, the
Court found that the rape of Ms. Loayza-Tamayo "could not be substantiated" and
thus the Court did not take up or rule on this issue.11 Nevertheless, the Court found
there were other violations under the right to be free of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment (Article 5) of Convention over the other actions committed against Ms.
Loayza-Tamayo during her confinement.
Finally, in Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru,12 the Court for the first time
incorporated a gender perspective into the analysis of human rights violations
perpetrated against women inmates in a Peruvian prison. After the Peruvian
Government carried an attack against several pavilions of a prison where persons
accused of terrorism were held, a number of injured women prisoners were transferred
to hospitals for treatment. Some of these inmates were stripped of their clothing once
they arrived at the hospital and forced to remain naked for a prolonged period of
8 Ibidem at 20; 27.
9 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Country Report on Haiti, 1995, available at: www.
cidh.oas.org/countryrep/EnHa95/EngHaiti.htm.
10 I/A Court HR, Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Series C no 33, 17 September 1997.
11 Ibidem at para. 58.
12 I/A Court HR, Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C no 160,
25 November 2006.
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time while they were watched by state agents. This situation implied a violation of
their right to personal dignity. The Court concluded that in the case of the six injured
female inmates, this treatment - forcing them to remain naked, covered only by a
sheet, while being surrounded and observed by armed men - additionally constituted
sexual violence. This situation was aggravated by the fact that the women were not
allowed to clean themselves, and, when using the restroom, were in the company of
armed men who pointed at them with weapons. In addition, the Court found that at
least one of the female inmates was subjected to a finger vaginal inspection carried out
by several hooded men at the same time and in a very abrupt manner. This situation
constituted rape, defined as any "act of vaginal or anal penetration, without the
victim's consent, through the use of other parts of the aggressor's body, as well as oral
penetration with the virile member." 3 The Court concluded that the rape constituted
torture in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.
In Ferndndez Ortega et al. and Rosendo Cant et al., the Court further scrutinised
Article 5 of the Convention in the context of using rape as an act of torture against
Mexico's indigenous women. The facts of both cases transpired in a context of
increased military presence in the state of Guerrero as part of a strategy to fight against
organised crime, particularly the drug trade. Between 1997 and 2004, there were six
complaints on rape perpetrated by members of the armed forces against indigenous
women in that state. All the complaints were investigated by the military jurisdiction,
but none of the alleged perpetrators were ever punished for those crimes.
Inks Fernandez Ortega was twenty-five years old when the facts of her case
occurred. She was a member of the indigenous group, the Me'phaa, in the state of
Guerrero, Mexico and spoke no Spanish. In March 2002, while Mexican soldiers came
to her home looking for her husband, one armed soldier held Mrs. Fernandez Ortega's
hands, forced her to lie down on the floor, and raped her while two onlookers observed
her assault. Mrs. Fernandez Ortega went to a hospital to receive medical services after
her assault, but the hospital was later unable to produce the medical evidence from
her gynaecological exam.
Mrs. Ferndndez Ortega's first attempt to report the rape to the Public Prosecutor
of the Common Jurisdiction of the Judicial District of Allende was denied because
it involved the military and because "[an agent at the Public Prosecutor's Office] did
not have time to receive the complaint." 14 Shortly thereafter, she was successfully
able to file a complaint with the local Public Prosecution Service after the Inspector
General of the Guerrero Human Rights Commission intervened. Her case was then
transferred to the Military Prosecution Service after the civilian system declined
jurisdiction because it involved military personnel. Like what happened with Mrs.
13 Ibidem at para. 310.
14 I/A Court HR, Ferndndez Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, supra note 2, at para. 85.
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Cantdi's case, Mrs. Fernandez Ortega's request that her case be heard in the civilian
court system was denied.
Mrs. Rosendo Canti was seventeen years old at the time the events in her case took
place. She was an indigenous woman from the same Me'phaa community in the state
of Guerrero, Mexico and did not speak Spanish. On February 16, 2002 she walked to
a local stream near her home to wash clothes. Eight armed soldiers and one civilian
stopped to question her about a list of names. She responded that she did not know the
people on the list. One soldier hit her in the stomach causing her to fall on the ground
and briefly lose consciousness. When she awoke, another soldier grabbed her by the
hair and told her they would kill her along with all the people in her community if
she did not answer their questions. Shortly afterwards, the soldiers scratched her face,
knocked her down, and two soldiers raped her while the others looked on.
Two days after her attack, Mrs. Rosendo Canto went to a health care clinic in the
nearby Caxitepec for her head injuries, but apparently did not report to the doctor
that she had been raped. Eight days after that, on February 26, 2002, she walked eight
hours to a hospital in Ayutla de los Libres, one of the municipalities of Guerrero.
While there, she received treatment for her abdominal pain but told the physician her
injuries were caused by a piece of falling wood.' 5 The next day Mrs. Rosendo Cantio
filed a complaint against members of the Mexican army for human rights violations
before the National Human Rights Commission. Consequently, the Commission
launched a preliminary investigation. On March 7, 2002 the Mexican League for the
Defense of Human Rights brought a claim over Mrs. Rosendo Cant6's case to the
Guerrero Commission for the Defense of Human Rights. The claim alleged acts of
torture, injury, and rape committed by the Mexican army.
On March 8, 2002, the Inspector General of the Human Rights Commission of
Guerrero heard statements by Mrs. Rosendo Canto and her husband. The Inspector
General also discovered that no criminal complaint over Mrs. Rosendo Cant's
rape had been filed. The Inspector General then sent a communication to the Public
Prosecutor's Office of Allende to start a preliminary investigation into the rape. On
the same day, Mrs. Rosendo Canttl went to the Public Prosecutor's Office of Allende
to file a criminal complaint. However, "they did not want to relieve the complaint...
and that she had been instructed by her superior to not take in the complaint."'16
Nevertheless, the Inspector General insisted the complaint be taken. On March 12,
2002, Mrs. Rosendo Cantil was examined by a female doctor at the Ayutla Hospital
who requested several tests. Finally, on March 19, 2002, she was examined by a doctor
within the Prosecutor's Office at Tlapa de Comonfort.
Two months after the victim filed her complaint with the Allende's Public Prosecutor
Office, Mexico's military justice system assumed control over the investigation. Mrs.
15 Idem.
16 I/A Court HR, Rosendo Cantd et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, supra note 3, at para. 78.
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Rosendo Cantd appealed to have the civilian Public Prosecution Service investigate
her case, and not the Military Prosecution Service. Nevertheless, her appeal was
denied. The military system's investigation into Mrs. Rosendo Cantt's case was open
for two years and inactive for another three. There have been no further attempts in
either the civilian or military system to identify or punish those responsible for raping
Mrs. Rosendo Cant6.
In Mrs. Ferndndez Ortega's case, the Commission found Mexico violated the
right to humane treatment and personal integrity (Article 5), right to a fair trial
and judicial guarantees (Article 8), and right to judicial protection (Article 25) of
the Convention in relation to the general obligations to respect and ensure human
rights established in Article 1(1). The Commission also found violations of the right
to privacy (Article 11), violation of Article 7 of the Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women ('Violence
against Women Convention'), and violations of Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Torture
Convention. In particular, the Commission noted Mexico's international responsibility
over the "rape and torture" of Mrs. FernAndez Ortega, the "lack of due diligence in
the investigation and punishment of the authors [of the rape]," the "failure to make
adequate reparations," and the use of the military justice system to prosecute human
rights violations. 7 The Commission made similar findings in Mrs. Rosendo Canti's
case but added more on the difficulties of indigenous women in finding adequate
healthcare. Notably, Mexico asked the Court to dismiss the charges alleging torture
in Mrs. Rosendo Cantt's case.
According to the Commission, the rapes of Mrs. Fernindez Ortega and Mrs.
Rosendo Cant6i constituted an act of torture because the three elements of torture
were met in this case: 1) it was an intentional act; 2) that caused severe suffering; and
3) committed with an end or purpose. The representatives on behalf of Mrs. FernAndez
Ortega agreed and asked the Court to declare Mexico responsible for violating Article
5(2) of the Convention, Article 7(b) of the Violence against Women Convention, and
Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Torture Convention.
Mexico responded with preliminary objections in Mrs. Fernindez Ortega and
Mrs. Rosendo Cantti's cases based on a lack of jurisdiction to determine violations
of the Violence against Women Convention. However, at the public hearing, the
state withdrew this objection. The state also asked the Court to reject the violations
under the Convention and other international human rights instruments. Notably,
in Mrs. Ferndndez Ortega's case, Mexico partially acknowledged its international
responsibility for the absence of specialised medical care owed to Mrs. Ferndndez
Ortega as well as the destruction of evidence taken at her gynaecological exam, which
were violations under Article 8(1) of the Convention. The state also acknowledge it had
not practiced due diligence regarding the rape's investigation, which are violations
17 I/A Court HR, Fernindez Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, supra note 2, at para. 2.
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under Articles 8(1) and 25 of the Convention. Regarding Mrs. Rosendo Cantfi the
state further acknowledged a violation of Article 19 owing to her status as a minor and
the corresponding rights of a child because she was seventeen when she was raped.
The state did not acknowledge its responsibility for the rapes of Mrs. Fernindez
Ortega or Mrs. Rosendo Cantd, that the rapes constituted an act of torture, or the
inappropriateness of using the military system of justice to investigate and prosecute
human rightsviolations. Mexico's position was that the representatives on behalfofMrs.
Fernindez Ortega and Mrs. Rosendo Canti could not prove the rape was committed
by agents of the state, and thus the state was not internationally responsible.'8
The Court found there was sufficient evidence to prove Mrs. Fernindez Ortega and
Mrs. Rosendo Cantfi were raped through direct and circumstantial evidence, including
their own testimony and evidence there was military in the area the day both victims
were attacked. The Court held in line with its prior conclusions in Miguel Castro-
Castro Prison v. Peru that rape was a paradigmatic form of violence against women
whose consequences extend beyond the individual victim. Moreover, in determining
whether the facts in both cases constituted torture, the Court looked to the definition
of torture in the Torture Convention and prior case law, in particular the standards
developed in Bueno Alves v. Argentina.19 Article 2 of the Torture Convention defines
torture as mistreatment that is: 1) intentional; 2) causes severe physical or mental
suffering; and 3) is committed with any objective or purpose.
The rapes of Mrs. Fernandez Ortega and Mrs. Rosendo Cantii were acts of torture
because the Court found all three elements were present. First, it was intentional
because one of the attackers took Mrs. FernAndez Ortega's hands, forced her to lie
down, and raped her in front of two observers. Second, there was severe physical or
mental suffering. The Court considered subjective factors like the action itself, the
duration, the method used, as well as the mental effects, age, gender, physical condition,
and status of the victim in making its determination. In Mrs. Fernindez Ortega's case,
while there was no evidence of physical injuries, she testified she was in pain after
her assault. Moreover, torture can be committed by physical violence as well as by
moral and mental suffering imposed on the victim. Victims of rape often experience
serious psychological and social consequences. In Mrs. Fernindez Ortega's case, she
was especially vulnerable as an indigenous woman as well as the fact two other armed
military personnel watched her rape. Therefore, the Court found ample evidence of
moral and psychological suffering in this case. Lastly, the rape of Mrs. FernAndez
Ortega's was committed for a purpose. Here, the soldiers were questioning the victim
about her husband's location. When they did not get the answer they wanted, one
soldier raped her. The Court's analysis of Mrs. Rosendo Cantii's rape constituting
an act of torture was nearly identical. Therefore, the Court found the rapes in these
18 lbidem at para. 5.
19 I/A Court HR, Bueno Alves v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Series C no 164, 11 May
2007.
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cases were torture under Article 5(2) of the Convention and Article 2 of the Torture
Convention.
The Court found further violations of the victim's personal integrity, personal
dignity, and private life in Articles 5(2), Article 11(1) and Article 11(2) of the
Convention as well as violations of Article 1, 2, and 6 of the Torture Convention,
and Article 7(a) of the Violence against Women Convention. Lastly, Mrs. Fernandez
Ortega and Mrs. Rosendo Cant&i's next of kin, including Mrs. Fernindez Ortega's
husband and both of the victims' children, also suffered violations under Article 5(1)
of the Convention resulting from the victims' rapes and the subsequent impunity and
lack of investigation into the facts of these cases.
Regarding the state's use of the military system of justice in investigating and
prosecuting human rights violations, Mexico argued that the military justice system
was competent, independent, and impartial and therefore could hear cases of this
nature. The state also focused on Mrs. Fernindez Ortega's arguable failure to cooperate
with the military system of justice in her case. Moreover, the state argued the rights
to judicial guarantees and judicial protection have not been violated because Mrs.
Fernandez Ortega and Mrs. Rosendo Cantii's rapes were still in the investigation stage
and had not been yet reviewed on the substance.
The Court first reiterated its prior holding in Radilla Pacheco v Mexico20 where this
Tribunal concluded that the application of military jurisdiction must be exceptional
and restricted only to the prosecution of acts of military service that affect the sphere
of the military order. Human rights violations of grave nature such as a forced
disappearance can never be characterised as an act of military service and, therefore,
the perpetrators of such crimes must be investigated and prosecuted by ordinary
courts. In Ferncndez Ortega and Rosendo Cant, the Court held that a victim's
rape perpetrated by military personnel did not bear any relationship to the military
discipline or mission, but affected the rights of individuals protected under domestic
criminal law and human rights law. Thus, as the rape perpetrated in the present cases
constituted human rights violations the cases had to be excluded from the military
jurisdiction. Second, the Court concluded that the guarantees in Article 8(1) do not
apply only to judges or in the trial stage of the proceedings. The investigation stage was
also subject to Article 8(1). Thus, the deprivation of the victims from having access to
the ordinary courts in the present case constituted a breach of the obligations arising
out of Articles 8, 25, and 1(1) of the Convention. Moreover, Mexico's military law,
specifically Article 57 of the Code of Military Justice, which extended jurisdiction to
all crimes committed by active soldiers regardless of the nature of the crime and the
individual affected was not compatible with the principles of due process enshrined
in the Convention and, in consequence, constituted an additional violation of Article
2 of that treaty. Lastly, there was a violation of Article 25(1) of the Convention owing
20 I/A Court HR, Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Series C no 209, 23 November 2009.
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to the fact there was not an appropriate remedy allowing Mrs. Fernandez Ortega or
Mrs. Rosendo Cantfi to challenge the competency of the military system of justice to
hear their cases.
The Court ordered that Mexico pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary reparations and
reimburse expenses incurred in the litigation of the cases to the victims and their
next of kin. The Court also ordered Mexico to investigate the rapes of both women
with due diligence, to reform the Code of Military Justice limiting the scope of
military jurisdiction in human rights abuse cases of civilians, to provide medical and
psychological treatment to the victims and their next of kin, award scholarships to
Mrs. Rosendo Canti and both victims' children so that they can pursue additional
studies, to develop a protocol to effectively investigate acts of sexual violence and
to allocate resources and establish mechanisms of prevention and protection for
indigenous women and girls, amongst other measures.
On 15 May 2011, the Court rejected the requests for interpretation of certain
aspects of the judgments on the merits and reparations in both cases, submitted by
Mexico on the basis of Article 67 of the American Convention.
2. THE CASE OF GOMES LUND ET AL. ("GUERRILHA
DO ARAGUAIA") V BRAZIL: THE INVALIDATION OF
BRAZIL'S AMNESTY LAW
In Gomes Lund 21, the Court heard another case involving broad amnesty laws passed
during a time of great political, military, and social upheaval. In two previous cases,
Barrios Altos v. Peru22 and Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile,23 the Court held
laws granting amnesty to gross violations of human rights are not tolerated under
international law. The reasoning set forth in these two cases was that amnesty
provisions are inherently incompatible with the spirit and aim of the Convention
in that they fail to hold those accused of human rights violations responsible for
their conduct and prevent victims from having the violations of their human rights
redressed. In Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, the Court found the murder of the
victim was a crime against humanity, and thus was a gross violation of human rights.
In Gomes Lund, the Court found forced disappearances constitute gross violations
of human rights for purposes of determining an amnesty law's validity. In the same
vein, the Commission has also developed an extensive body of case law regarding the
21 I/A Court HR, Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, supra note 3.
22 I/A Court HR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Series C no 75, 14 March 2001.
23 I/A Court HR, Almonacid Arellano et al v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Series C no 154, 26 September 2006.
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incompatibility of amnesty laws in Argentina, 24 Chile, 25 El Salvador, 26 Peru 27 and
Uruguay.28
The Guerrilha do Araguaia was a resistance movement within the members of the
Communist Party of Brazil in the 1970s during the military dictatorship in Brazil,
which lasted from 1964-1985. Between 1972 and 1975, the Brazilian Army launched
a campaign to eradicate them. Initially, the members of the armed forces involved in
the operation had orders not to kill or subject to forced disappearance those who were
detained for their participation in the guerrilla group. Later, however, the policy was
changed and the armed forces received orders to eliminate those who were captured
and to bury them in the jungle.
Brazil passed its Amnesty Law in 1979. The Amnesty Law absolved all those who
committed human rights violations and other crimes between 2 September 1961
and 15 August 1979. As a result of its application those responsible for the forced
disappearance of the members of the Guerrilha do Araguaia had not been investigated,
prosecuted, or punished. On April 29, 2010, the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil
affirmed the legality of the Amnesty Law in a seven-to-two vote. The Federal Supreme
Court reasoned that it was not within their power to change the text of the Amnesty
Law. Moreover, after it was integrated into the Constitution of 1988, the law's validity
"is unquestionable."29 The Federal Supreme Court's decision did not discuss Brazil's
international legal obligations.30
Brazil became a party to the American Convention in 1995 and recognised the
Court's contentious jurisdiction in 1998. In 1995, Brazil passed Law No. 9.140/95
where the state recognised its responsibility for the forced disappearance of 136
persons during the dictatorship, including 60 members of the Guerrilha de Araguaia.
This law also created a Special Commission to continue the process of identifying
individuals whose murder or disappearance for political reasons had not been included
in the initial list of victims. Also, the law established the payment of reparations to
benefit the victim's next of kin. Between 1980 and 2006, the victim's next of kin, the
Special Commission, and other governmental entities carried out thirteen visits to
24 I/A Comm H.R., Alicia Consuelo Herrera et al v. Argentina, Report 28/92, Cases 10147, 10181, 10262,
10309 and 10311, 2 October 1992, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights 1992-1993.
25 See, inter alia, IA Comm. HR, Hector Garay Hermosilla et al v Chile, Report 36/96, Case 10,843,
October 15, 1996, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1996.
26 See, inter alia, IA Comm. HR, Ignacio Ellacuria et al v. El Salvador, Report No 136/99, Case 10,488,
December 22, 1999, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1999.
27 See, inter alia, IA Comm. HR, Americo Zabala Martinez v Peru, Report No 44/00, Case 10,820,
April 13, 2000, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1999.
28 IA Comm. HR, Hugo Leonardo de los Santos Mendoza et al. v. Uruguay, Report 29/92, Cases 10,029,
10,036, 10,145, 10,305, 10,372, 10,373, 10,374 and 10,375, October 2, 1992, Annual Report of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992-1993.
29 I/A Court HR, Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, supra note 3, at para. 136.
30 Ibidem at para. 177.
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the Araguaia region to locate and identify the victims' remains. By the time the Court
adopted the present judgment, however, only the remains of four of the victims had
been apparently recovered.
The two most important issues raised in the present judgment were the forced
disappearance of the members of the Guerrilha de Araguaia and the incompatibility
of Brazil's Amnesty Law of 1979 with the Convention, particularly Articles 1(1), 2,
8(1), and 25 of that treaty.
The Commission and the victims' representatives claimed that the facts in the
present case occurred in the framework of a practice of forced disappearance in which
members of the Brazilian armed forces used their official position and state resources
to disappear all the members of the Guerrilha de Araguaia. All the evidence regarding
their murder was hidden and the perpetrators refused to give information regarding
the whereabouts and fate of the victims. Despite the acknowledgment of Brazil at
the domestic jurisdiction of the victims' murders and the reparations afforded to
their next of kin, after more than 35 years the truth about what transpired to them
remained uncertain. Thus, the Commission and the representatives claimed that
Brazil was responsible for the violation of Articles 3 (right to juridical personality),
4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment) and 7 (right to personal liberty) of the
American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) (obligation to respect rights) of that
treaty. Brazil did not contest these allegations.
The Court found proven that the disappearance of 62 members of the Guerrilha de
Araguaia was attributable to Brazil as a result of the participation of state agents in the
detention, torture, and alleged murder of those victims between 1972 and 1974. Until
the adoption of the present judgment, the remains of only two of those victims had
been identified. Also, this Tribunal reiterated that the forced disappearance of persons
has a permanent character and entails the continuous violation of several rights until
the victim is located or the remains are found. Ultimately, as it is established practiced,
the Court held that Brazil was responsible for the violation of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 1(1)
of the Convention to the detriment of the victims established as such in the present
case.
Next, the Commission argued that the investigation and punishment of the
perpetrators of the victims' forced disappearances was prevented due to the application
of the 1979 Amnesty Law. It claimed that this is contrary to obligations set forth in
Articles 8 (right to a fair trial) and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the Convention.
Furthermore, no domestic law such as amnesties or statutes of limitation can prevent
a state from complying with its international obligations, especially when dealing
with serious violations of human rights. Thus, according to the Commission, Brazil
violated Articles 8(1) and 25 in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 (domestic legal effects) of
the Convention. The representatives of the victims agreed but added that Brazil also
failed to codify forced disappearances as a crime in its domestic law, which is a further
violation under Article 2.
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Brazil stressed that the Court recognise the Amnesty Law was passed in its specific
context. Moreover, Brazil argued that the principle of legality and non-retroactivity
enshrined in Article 9 of the Convention constitutes one of the most important due
process rights and a constitutional right under Brazil's Constitution that cannot be
abolished. Moreover, the state argued that even the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons envisions in Article VII that this crime can be
subjected to a statute of limitations. Also, Brazil claimed that the codification of crimes
against humanity occurred only with the adoption of the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court and that international custom cannot be a source that
creates criminal law because it is uncertain. The state further argued that the rights in
the Convention should be viewed through the principle of proportionality. According
to Brazil, there was an apparent conflict between the guarantees of non-repetition to
which the victims are entitled and the principles of legality and non-retroactivity that
must be ensured to the alleged perpetrators. Thus, the best way to respect Article 9 was
to consider the domestic measures Brazil has already taken as sufficient in meeting its
international responsibility. Lastly, Brazil noted the fact the 1979 Amnesty Law did
not apply to only political or military figures and crimes, but it was also designed to
exclude those who were on the other side of the political spectrum.
The Court continued its consistent jurisprudence in Barrios Altos v. Peru and
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile and concluded that amnesty laws cannot be granted
to crimes involving gross violations of human rights. Forced disappearances were gross
violations of human rights, and therefore Brazil cannot ignore its duty under Article
1(1) of the Convention to investigate, prosecute, and punish due to its Amnesty Law.
To bolster its opinion, the Court noted similar findings regarding amnesty provisions
in various United Nations bodies, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, the
European and African systems, as well as judgments from the highest courts in several
countries of the region, including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Peru.
The failure to investigate and punish the perpetrators of the victims' forced
disappearances prevented their next of kin from their right to access to court under
Article 8(1) of the Convention and to an effective remedy under Article 25 of the same
treaty. Furthermore, once Brazil ratified the Convention, the state was under a duty
to adjust domestic laws and practices to make them compatible with the rights and
principles upheld by that treaty. Brazil's failure to do so breached the general obligation
provided by Article 2 of the Convention. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Brazil's
Amnesty Law lacked legal effects for purposes of preventing the prosecution of those
responsible for the victims' forced disappearances in the present case or to investigate
other gross human rights violations that occurred in Brazil at the time covered by that
law. As it has done in prior cases, 31 the Court placed the burden upon domestic courts
31 I/A Court HR, Almonacid Arellano et al v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, supra note 24, at paras. 124-128.
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and called upon them to exercise a so-called "conventionality control" to ensure that
Brazil's international obligations under the Convention are enforced in the context
of domestic cases. According to the Court, the duty of all state organs to uphold the
international obligations to which Brazil has voluntarily consented is based on the
principle of good faith enshrined in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
Regarding Brazil's arguments on the principles of legality and retroactivity, the
Court reiterated that the crime of forced disappearances is on-going in nature and its
criminal effects do not cease until the victim is located and the identity is established.
Thus, in the present case, there was no retroactive application of the crime of forced
disappearances and the duty to investigate resulting from its perpetration. Finally, the
Court rejected Brazil's arguments regarding the need to strike a balance between the
interests of the victims and those of the perpetrators by concluding that when making
that assessment the state failed to consider the victims' rights under Article 8 and 25.
As for reparations, the Court ordered Brazil to investigate, prosecute, and punish
those responsible for the victim's forced disappearance and make all efforts to
determine their location and identify their remains. Brazil must also provide medical
and psychological treatment to the victim's next of kin, publish selected excerpts of
the present judgment, acknowledge its international responsibility publically, develop
training programs for those in the hierarchical levels of the Armed Forces, and adopt
new legislation improving access to information in the hands of the state, among
others. Regarding the payment ofpecuniary damages, the Court acknowledged that the
majority of the victims had received reasonable compensation by the state under Law
9140/95. With respect to those victims whose next of kin had not claimed reparations,
the Court ordered Brazil to make the appropriate reparations within six months by
following the same procedures applied to the other victims. Furthermore, the Court
awarded non-pecuniary damages to compensate for the suffering experienced by the
victim's next of kin. Finally, the Court ordered the reimbursement of the costs and
expenses incurred in the litigation of the present case.
It is worth noting that on 24 February 2011 the Court adopted a judgment in
Gelman v Uruguay32 in which it found that the Amnesty Law in Uruguay (known
as the 'Caducidad Law') was also incompatible with the Convention. In future
submissions, we will cover the relevant aspects of this judgment, which also involved
the characterisation of the illegal appropriation of minors as a forced disappearance
of persons.
32 I/A Court HR, Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Series C no 221, 24 February 2011.
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